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Abstract: 
 
Background thinking for the Madrid terrorism summit has stemmed partly from the 9/11 
Commission and Spain’s Comisión 11-M. Their presentations fall short on pinpointing the 
sources of attacks that carry the most risk and how best to respond. Terrorist attacks over 
the last decades follow a power-law distribution, which anticipates future terrorist events 
with ever broader effects. Intelligence estimates based on models keyed to frequency and 
recency of past occurrences make us less secure even if they predict most terrorist events. 
Evolution, complex adaptive systems, and WWII experience from British intelligence provide 
salutary lessons for thinking “outside the box” with decentralized expertise. History shows 
that people do not readily panic in surprise attacks and that local actors may be best able to 
organize response efforts. Proposals to centralize intelligence and unify command and 
control are not promising given recent transformations in terrorist networks in the wake of 
Al-Qaeda’s operational demise.  
 
The author is Scott Atran of the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan 
and the National Center for Scientific Research in Paris. He thanks Robert Axelrod, Isaac 
Ben Israel, Richard Garwin, Pervez Hoodbhoy, Scott Page, Marc Sageman, Simon Wessely 
and Richard Wilson for suggestions on an earlier draft. Please contact the author at the 
Institute for Social research, University of Michigan, 426 Thompson St., Ann Arbor, MI 
48106-1248; satran@umich.edu. 
 
____________________ 
 
 
Last year’s hearings of the 9/11 Commission in the USA and the Comisión 11-M in Spain 
were chartered to examine preparedness for the worst terrorist attacks in the history of 
their countries and to provide recommendations designed to guard against future attacks. 
Hindsight criticisms of preparedness from all sides of the political divide suffer from the 
illusion that the gathering storm was foreseeable, as in a video run backwards. What is 
more serious is that, although the historical reporting by the commissions is often 
admirable, the recommendations[1] and testimony[2] elicited so far fall short on pinpointing 
the sources of attacks that carry the most risk and how best to respond. 
 
Large and rare events are responsible for most of the cataclysmic and cascading 
consequences that shape history (climatic and biological disasters, major financial and 
health crises, political and cultural revolutions, increasingly destructive wars and terrorism). 
People do not repeat history's catastrophes because they forget them; people build up self-
destructing ideologies and behavior patterns that continue history's catastrophic path 
because they remember the past too well. The coaches and players of successful sports 
teams seem to intuitively understand the point. Once a rival team runs a trick play, shame 
on you if they do it to you again. So, teams prepare for trick plays. But how does a team 
prepare for a new trick play? What local information can lead to a global (or team) response 
that something strange is a foot? Certainly not just by re-reading the play book.[3] True, 
the past is all we have as a guide to the future, but fixing on what is most frequent and 
near in time can miss the blindside.[4] 
 
The failure of Israeli Military Intelligence in the October 1973 “Yom-Kippur” War is a good 
example of what General Isaac Ben Israel, one of Israel’s top military strategists, calls “the 
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fallacy of induction.”[5] Preparations for a surprise attack by Egypt and Syria took place 
under cover of a series of military exercises called “Tahrir 41.” After careful scrutiny of the 
previous 40 exercises, Israeli Intelligence learned the Tahrir pattern all too well. “When the 
41st began, we immediately recognized the pattern and assessed it to be another exercise 
in the series,” says Ben Israel, “only this time the Egyptians deviated from the pattern and 
crossed the canal.” 
 
Another example Ben Israel cites is the supposed menace from Iraqi WMDs, though here 
the bias in judgment is more a “fallacy of immediate relevance,” that is, concentrating on 
what is most obvious and direct and not on what may be indirect but potentially most 
telling. All intelligence reports noted past attempts by Iraq to build and hide such weapons, 
but no one really bothered to ask if Iraq had the operational capability to still use them, and 
if there is no such capacity, then either there are no weapons or they are useless: “Surely 
you don’t expect to dig the hidden missiles out of the sand, 12 years after they had been 
buried there, and launch them without all sorts of training and equipment. There was not 
even one intelligence report on these subjects.” As in science, only bold conjectures, 
deductions and refutations can reliably reduce uncertainty. 
 
Intelligence estimates continue to be based primarily on models keyed to frequency and 
recency of past occurrences, making us less secure even if they predict most terrorist 
events. The more we look to the ripples, the less we are prepared for a tsunami. The more 
we fix on box-cutters and airport security, the more vulnerable we may become. A recent 
paper in Physics and Society charts terrorist attacks worldwide between 1968 and 2004, as 
compiled in the National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) 
database.[6] It finds that very few terrorist attacks account for a very large percentage of 
casualties. Mathematicians call this trend a "power law distribution." This trend anticipates 
future terrorist events with ever broader political, economic and social effects, and points 
toward ever more massive attack.  
 
Jihadists who live more and more in a virtual global community with little institutional 
control – and who plan attacks with less and less concern for retaliation on their own home 
territories and populations - appear to obey a devotional logic immune to material 
compromise, classical risk management or conventional games of deterrence. When I 
interview would-be suicide bombers – members of the radical fraternity of “Born Again” 
Islam - I ask questions of the sort: “So what if your family were to be killed in retaliation for 
your action?” or “What if your father were dying and your mother found out your plans for a 
martyrdom attack and asked you to delay until the family could get back on its feet?” To a 
person they answer along the lines that there is duty to family and duty to God but duty to 
God cannot be postponed.[7]   
 
Current risk management approaches to countering terrorism often assume adversaries 
model the world on the basis of rational choices that are commensurable across cultures. 
But for the would-be martyrs I have interviewed it often doesn’t matter that others will reap 
the rewards of his sacrifice. Neither does it seem to matter for those who issue religious 
edicts (fatwahs) condoning Jihadist martyrdom if the martyr (shaheed) kills thousands of 
foes or no one but himself – he will attain Paradise just the same. Such findings suggest 
that devotional values are not very sensitive to standard calculations of cost and benefit, to 
quantity or to tradeoffs across different moral and cultural frameworks. This means that 
traditional calculations of how how to defeat or deter an enemy (for example by eliminating 
most key operatives or threatening destruction of supporting populations) may not 
succeed.[8] 
 
One of the most important post 9/11 developments in Global Network Jihad is that surviving 
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Al Qaeda offshoots and newly emerging Jihadist groups and cells no longer consider 
themselves to be territorially rooted in supporting populations. Unconstrained by concrete 
concerns for what will happen to any population that supports them, they can allow 
themselves to seriously imagine fulfillment of their apocalyptic vision.[9[ “God has ordered 
us to build nuclear weapons," proclaimed Fazlur Rahman Khalil of Pakistan's Harkat ul-
Mujahedeen on CBS television's 60 Minutes II. A subsequent suicide attack on India's 
Parliament in December 2001 by Jaish-e-Muhammed, a Pakistani splinter group of the al-
Qaeda affiliate that Khalil heads, perhaps brought nuclear war closer than at any time since 
the Cuban Missile Crisis.[10] Imagine what these people could do with the non-conventional 
weapons they actively seek. A fatwah released in September 2003 in Al-Qaeda's name 
declares that "nuclear warfare is the solution for destroying America." In April 2004, Hafez 
Sayeed, leader of the disbanded Pakistani Jihadist group Lashkar-e-Taiba, said that "mass 
killing of non-believers is the only solution to international conflicts in the Muslims' favor."  
 
Physicist Richard Garwin, a former U.S. presidential adviser and recipient of the National 
Medal of Science, sees suicide terrorists more likely to explode a small nuclear device at 
ground level, rather than in the air by missile or plane, because it is easier to deliver. “If 
such a device were delivered by truck or train and detonated in a densely populated area,” 
Garwin told me, "more people would be killed by radiation than in the Hiroshima air burst." 
(Harvard physicist Richard Wilson chimed in that the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs were 
deliberately exploded at 500 feet to avoid radiation, so that 99% of the 300,000 or so 
casualties came directly from the bomb blasts). Garwin is concerned that not enough is 
being done to prevent theft of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU). He notes that U.S. and 
Soviet Union made an agreement some years back that the United States would provide 20 
billion dollars to take 500 tons of HEU - enough for some 8 to 20 thousand nuclear bombs—
and reduce them from about 94% weapons uranium to about 4% nuclear grade that can be 
used in nuclear reactors. This process is now a little more than half way through. But there 
are still hundreds of additional tons of uranium in the former Soviet Union that have not 
been reprocessed. The additional cost of early reprocessing that, not down to 4% but just 
down to 19%, would be in the tens of millions rather than billions of dollars.  
 
General Anatoly Kulikov, Vice-Chairman of the Russian Duma’s Security Committee, 
downplays the risk of waiting. At a NATO workshop on suicide terrorism that I co-chaired 
with Ariel Merari last summer,[11] Kulikov declared: “we are absolutely certain that current 
safeguards make theft of HEU practically impossible in our country.” Outside experts are not 
so sure.  
 
Pakistani physicist Pervez Hoodbhoy, who presently devotes much of his life to easing 
tensions between Pakistan and India,[12] and who was one of the first to publicly warn 
against the rogue nuclear operations of fellow countryman Abdul Qader Khan, does not fear 
so much that terrorists could manufacture a plutonium device like North Korea now says it 
has (which can only be used in an implosion mode that is hard for non-state actors to 
engineer because it requires highly sophisticated technology to achieve exact spherical 
symmetry and extremely precise timing) or even steal a HEU device (because of 
sophisticated locks that render the weapon useless if tampered with). But he is concerned 
that HEU can be mined from existing stockpiles in the former Soviet Union for use in a gun-
type weapon. It would probably have to be built on location from smuggled parts because 
fabrication would require a bit of room, at least an apartment. The worry is that well-
educated and motivated Jihadist sympathizers - like the anarchist student bomb-makers a 
century ago [13] – know as much about what is needed as those trying to stop them. “Any 
graduate student of mine who couldn’t design a workable nuclear bomb,” Hoodbhoy said 
without boast, “doesn’t deserve a Ph.D.” (The basic principles for an A-bomb design, though 
not for an H-bomb, can be had from the declassified Serber lectures). 
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How do we make sure that we stop those who yearn for apocalyptic terror? We can’t be 
certain to ever completely prevent an attack or eliminate its effects, but we can greatly 
reduce the risk of attack and, if attacked, strongly contain the damage and suffering. Yet 
current proposals out of the 9/11 and 11-M commissions to centralize intelligence and unify 
response command and control are not promising on either count. Evolutionary science 
teaches us that many small and energetic creatures can usually overwhelm and out 
compete larger and more ponderous ones.[14] The Santa Fe Institute’s Scott Page suggests 
that the theory of complex adaptive systems conveys a parallel lesson: if you want to solve 
a novel problem in an applied field – say, a mathematical puzzle in economics – you’re more 
likely to succeed by consulting a random selection of problem solvers than a narrow 
selection of the discipline’s top experts.[15] 
 
R.V. Jones, the father of “scientific intelligence,” implicitly knew all of this.[16] With the 
Battle of Britain in full swing and his country’s back to the wall, this junior staffer networked 
a hodgepodge of thinkers to deal with national survival, from actor Leslie Howard (of Gone 
with the Wind fame) to the Bletchley cryptographers, such as the unconventional 
mathematical wizard and sometimes biological theorist, Alan Turing, who founded computer 
science. They blocked the Luftwaffe to prevent the invasion of Britain (by bending guidance 
beacons so that bombs fell off target), and capped the missile menace that represented the 
Nazis’ last hope of survival (by focusing decryption efforts not on immediate operations but 
on V-1 and V-2 trails in Poland). They didn’t simply think outside the box, by adding new 
dimensions. They also became expert at tinkering with the same box, re-conceptualizing it 
using different variables or a different coordinate system. They combined old rules to form 
new, creating a huge lego kit and by so doing were able to “deconstruct” apparently 
complicated messages into relatively simply code. 
 
Another lesson from wartime Britain was that local citizens and responders drawn from the 
population under attack were more efficient than any central planners in caring for their 
people, preventing panic and helping them get back on their feet.[17] The attacks on the 
World Trade Center and the Madrid commuter trains carry a similar lesson. For the most 
part, local citizens responded immediately and efficiently. Not only was there no panic, but 
in the case of the World Trade Center, the victims of the attack responded much better than 
any current response model would have predicted. They were “better than rational.” 
University of Delaware sociologist Kathleen Tierney finds that locally aware actors are best 
able to respond to unexpected and varied local conditions.[18] One irony of 9/11 was that 
the principal facility of the New York Mayor’s Office of Emergency Management, located at 7 
World Trade Center, was completely destroyed in the attack. But volunteers who came 
primarily from local universities began staffing a geographic information systems (GIS) and 
mapping unit within New York City’s emergency operations center, and a motley collection 
of local boats spontaneously began to efficiently coordinate supply and relief efforts well 
before official efforts were under way. 
 
Although the 9/11 and 11-M commissions were not mandated to deal with root causes of 
terrorism, understanding those causes is surely relevant to homeland security. Knowing 
what motivates terrorists to act as they do can be a great help in figuring out how to stop 
them. Nevertheless, there is woefully little sign of any serious attempt to understand these 
causes, much less address them. This is evident in the routine references to “The War on 
Poverty” and “The War of Ideas” (or “The Battle for Hearts and Minds”) as necessary parts 
of the “The War on Terror.” These knee-jerk call to arms are lazy holdovers from the 
(admittedly successful) past struggles of liberal democracies to reduce blue-collar crime, 
where poverty and failures in education did prove to be reliable factors.[19] But with global 
terrorism, as with crimes of passion, these factors don’t appear to be significant (neither is 
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psychopathology or sociopathy).[20] 
 
Nearly every social science study of popular support for terrorism suggests that 
impoverishment and failure of education are not essential elements, despite proclamations 
by Nobel laureates, World Bank officials, UN ambassadors, U.S. and European leaders and 
the press. Studies suggest that most suicide bombers and Al-Qaeda operatives are more 
educated and economically better off than their home populations.[11,21] Few ever lived 
hand-to-mouth, or even attended religious madrassahs (except for Indonesian Jemaah 
Islamiyah). Pools of poverty can provide some ”water” in which the “fish” can swim – or at 
least hide - but not unexceptionally so. Moreover, poll after poll indicates that the hearts 
and minds of the tens of millions of people who probably sympathize with Bin Laden and 
company are already open to ideas of participatory government, freedom of expression, 
economic choice and educational advancement.  
 
Rather, what seems to matter most in inciting sympathy with militant Jihad, is the political 
failure to meet rising aspirations - dashed expectations often fueled by global 
communication of what other people around the world have and one might have hoped 
for.[10] Princeton University economist Alan Krueger finds terrorism worldwide to be 
correlated with denial of civil liberties (as defined by Freedom House, which works in 
coordination with the U.S. State Department), but not per capita income or amount of 
schooling.[22] University of Michigan political scientist Mark Tessler shows in surveys that in 
Middle Eastern countries the one reliable indicator of support for the 9/11 attacks is lack of 
confidence in one‘s own government (among North Africans this is highly correlated with 
distrust of the European Union), not age, gender, economic status, education, strength of 
religious conviction or attitude toward democracy.[23] Nor does Islam per se or “Muslim 
civilization” really have anything to do with terrorism – no more than some impossibly 
timeless or context-free notion of Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism or Buddhism can be held 
responsible for the millions of dead these religious traditions have been accused of. 
Arguments by outsiders that militant Islam can be undermined by showing it doesn’t reflect 
the religion’s “truth” or “essence” are likewise vacuous, for there is no “essence” or fixed 
content to any religion [24] (though debates among Muslims about – for example – whether 
killing children is acceptable, are critical to how their religion will be interpreted and 
applied). [25]  
 
The historical precondition for turning popular support away from global Jihad, as well as for 
securing the popular legitimacy of any form of governance, is to instill in potential recruits 
from Arab and Muslim communities the confidence that they have some significant measure 
of control over their own fate – enough to help ensure the safety of people they care about 
and preserve the cultural identity that gives primary meaning to their existence. For our 
part, we need to show that we are prepared to accept “democracy’s paradox” by supporting 
popularly elected outcomes we may not like, so long as they don’t breed violence. 
 
Soft-power efforts to convincingly offer alternative visions of a fair and just society may 
demand more patience than governments under attack, or being pressured to reform, 
typically are able to politically tolerate in times of crisis. But the necessary forbearance must 
be found to avoid increasingly catastrophic devastation to the democracies of Europe and 
the Americas, and to future hopes of Asian and African peoples who aspire to soft 
empowerment from a free and open world. Clearly, none of this necessitates negotiating 
with terrorist groups that sponsor murderous martyrs in pursuit of goals such as Al-Qaeda’s 
quest to impose a global caliphate and do away with the Western-inspired system of nation-
states represented at the UN. Those who choose to join the mission of Bin Laden’s “World 
Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders,” and who seek no compromise, 
must be fought with hard power to the end. 
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The main challenge, though, may lie with uprooted and egalitarian Muslim young adults in 
European cities, who provided the manpower for both the 9/11 and 11-M attacks. There is 
no indication that any rival to Jihadism’s uncompromising vision of a fair and just society – 
which debriefings show clearly motivate these people - is being conveyed to them. Secular 
education and liberal democracy do not by themselves speak sufficiently to the spiritual and 
cultural needs that their rootlessness generates. Immigrant integration into European 
societies has always been more difficult than in America, being more state-driven and “top 
down” than community-based and “bottom up.” In the USA, for example, if an immigrant 
group pays local property taxes, then the schools that run on those taxes tend to be more 
sensitive to cultural diversity. By contrast, Jules Ferry, the French prime minister who 
instituted modern secular education in Europe, once bragged that he knew what every 
public school teacher in every town in France would be teaching at a given time. Observes 
French political scientist Olivier Roy,[26] in Europe “multiculturalism” is taken not as valuing 
diversity but as a sign of withdrawal – an attempt to create alien entities between the 
individual and state. That’s why almost the entire political spectrum of France opposed 
attempts by Muslim girls to wear headscarves in public schools. 
 
The Madrid hearings indicate that the situation may be worse in some ways now than at the 
time of 9/11. There is no longer the controlling agency of the Al-Qaeda leadership to target, 
which seems to be operationally near dead: remnants of the – mostly Egyptian - hardcore 
around Bin Laden haven’t managed an attack in over two years, don’t know who many of 
the new terrorists are, and can’t communicate secretly with those they do know. Instead, 
groups of buddies originating from the same area “back home” in North Africa or the Middle 
East, or from similar European housing projects and marginal neighborhoods, bond into 
action as they surf Jihadist websites on the internet to find direction from Al-Qaeda’s 
inspiration.  
 
Analyzing case studies of more than 400 Jihadists, University of Pennsylvania forensic 
psychiatrist Marc Sageman, a former intelligence officer who ran operations during the 
Afghan-Soviet War, finds that the social networks of these hard-to-penetrate militant 
groups are composed of about 20% kin and 70% friends (who tend to become kin over time 
through intermarriage).[27] They may read an internet text like “Iraqi Jihad” that suggests 
bombing Spanish trains to force that country’s withdrawal from the US-led coalition in Iraq, 
and – presto – in 8 weeks an “amateur” plot is hatched and devastatingly executed (unlike 
the 5 years or so it took Al-Qaeda to plan and execute 9-11).[28] The fact that all of the 
plotters are caught or blow themselves up may have no effect on the ability of other groups 
to self-organize for single or multiple attacks. A new and vibrant Jihadist “market” is 
emerging, which is decentralized, self-organizing and self-correcting. How do we deal with 
that? Merely pounding away likely won’t do the trick. Like pummeling mercury with a 
hammer, raw police force and military might only seem to generate more varied and 
insidious forms of the Jihadist hydra. Neither the 9/11 or 11-M commissions demonstrate 
much awareness of what now may be the central security problem of our time. 
 
A key insight of R.V. Jones was that strategies to defeat an enemy must change with 
changes in scale. It may take distributed networks to fight local networks. Informal bonds 
may need to grow among diverse experts with idosyncratic personal skills and the 
operational branches fighting terrorism, so that a phone call from an expert or operator in 
one country to another country can trigger specific responses without plodding through 
official channels. Classically hierarchical forms of military and intelligence “command and 
control” were suitable for large scale operations against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda’s global 
organization, but are less so now (though classical means are still needed to prevent 
sanctuaries from re-emerging). 
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On offense, battling terrorist networks may further require what Rand analysts David 
Ronfeldt and John Arquila call “netwar,”[29] including a revamped military that can 
franchise out operations to culturally astute and specialized mobile units that are able to 
tactically mimic and master increasingly elusive terrorist "swarms" – by homing in from 
scattered locations on multiple targets, then dispersing to form new swarms. But combating 
terrorism may also demand new strategic forms of “spider webbing” powered by 
multilateral, interfaith alliances of transnational, national and local groups. Bonded by 
mutual trust, purpose and dedication, these multi-channel associations could have the broad 
collective intelligence and resourcefulness to felicitously net and disrupt emerging swarms. 
Thus far terrorists seem better at networking - politically and operationally - than does the 
multi-nation enterprise arrayed against them. 
 
On defense, Todd Laporte of the University of California at Berkeley finds in a review of U.S. 
nuclear facilities the best way to ward off unexpected catastrophe is to have decentralized 
networks with specialized teams of technically competent people whose culture rewards 
them for revealing their own errors [30] - a practice Al-Qaeda has used offensively to great 
effect. This tact contrasts markedly with recommendations for further directorial control of 
security services. Even now there is no institutional means for intelligence case officers who 
may know better to challenge information once it is passed on by “the 7th floor” (political 
directorship). 
 
The 9/11 commission hearings in the USA and Comisión 11-M hearings in Spain intimate 
that our common political culture still lacks the audacious imagination and creative 
accountability to effectively communicate the real risks (even if largely unpredictable) and 
prepare the right responses (even if only partial) to face catastrophic threats.[31] Rather 
than confront matters squarely, acknowledging misjudgments in order to learn from 
mistakes, as good businessmen or scientists would do, many of our most influential 
politicians and pundits continue passing off responsibility or spinning justifications about 
how they’ve always been right and on the ball. Running forward, while looking backwards 
instead of ahead to the unknown, inevitably leads to a crash. 
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Beginning in the 1880s, a loosely-connected worldwide terrorist movement arose, 
egalitarian in principle and dedicated to the elimination of the power of the state and 
international capital. The world community of nations considered anarchism to pose the 
greatest threat to the internal political and economic order, and to international stability. 
Between 1894 and 1900, anarchist assassins had killed the President of France, the 
Empress of Austria and the King of Italy. In Russia, anarchists would assassinate numerous 
government ministers.  
 
In September 1901, anarchist Leon Czolgosz assassinated President William McKinley. 
McKinley's assassination came after a wave of anarchist terrorism in Europe. The political 
(and to some extent social and economic) consequences were similar in many respects to 
those of the 9/11 attacks. [D. Rapoport, Anthropoetics 8 (Spring /Summer 2002).]  In his 
first Annual Message to Congress, the new president Theodore Roosevelt declared 
anarchism to be the incarnation of “evil” and a “foe of liberty” acting against all mankind: 
“The cause of his criminality is to be found in his own evil passions and in the evil conduct of 
those who urge him on, not in any failure by others or by the state to do justice to him or 
his.” [T. Roosevelt, First Annual Message to Congress, 3 December 1901, available at 
http://www.geocities.com/presidentialspeeches/1901.htm,] The President expanded this 
mission to eliminate terrorism and anarchy everywhere into an imperial mission to intervene 
in any country around the world if necessary to protect it from foreign evil and preserve it 
from chaos.: “Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of 
the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by 
some civilized nation, and may lead the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant 
cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power.” 
[T. Roosevelt, The Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, May 1904, available at 
http://www.theodore-roosevelt.com/trmdcorollary.html.] Teddy Roosevelt made the defeat 
of anarchism an overriding mission of his administration: “When compared with the 
suppression of anarchy, every other question sinks into insignificance. The anarchist is the 
enemy of humanity, the enemy of all mankind; and his is a deeper degree of criminality 
than any other.” [Submission to 60th U.S. Congress, Apr. 9, 1908, Doc. 426, by Ch. 
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Bonaparte, Attorney General, on behalf of Pres. Th. Roosevelt, available at 
http://tmh.floonet.net/articles/bonaparte.html.]  
 
State reaction to anarchism played a formative role in creating national police and 
intelligence (FBI, Scotland Yard, Russian Okhrana). What seemed to make anarchism such a 
pressing threat was the radical transformation in political, economic, communication and 
transportation patterns of the age. Under popular pressures unleashed by the French 
Revolution – whose leader Maximilien Robespierre first introduced the idea of “terror” as 
ruthless tool for the preservation of freedom and liberty [M. Robespierre, Principes de 
morale politique” Speech to French National Convention, 5 February 1794, available at 
http://membres.lycos.fr/discours/1794.htm] – absolute monarchies were softening into 
constitutional monarchies and even liberal trade democracies. Peoples and capital moved 
across international frontiers with an ease that in many respects in not even matched in 
today’s era of “globalization.”  In 1912, two years before the start of WWI, just Imperial 
Russia and the Turkish Sultanate required passports. Only with the world trade agreements 
in the late 1990s were capital flows again able to recover this pre-WWI degree of freedom. 
The telegraph, daily mass newspapers, and railroads flourished in this period. [The first 
“real-time” diffusion of news across the world could be arguably dated to August 27, 1883, 
when the Indonesian volcano-island Krakatoa exploded and disappeared, S. Winchester, 
Krakatoa (HarperCollins, New York, 2003).] Also in 1912, the first transpacific 
radiotelegraph service linked San Francisco with Hawaii. The airplane, automobile and 
transcontinental communication by wireless radio were beginning to shrink time and space 
by quantum leaps over all previous advances in human history that make today’s 
information revolution and globalization trends pale by comparison.  
 
Perhaps most worrisome, though, was the ability of anarchists to get their hands on 
weapons of mass destruction. The machine gun, invented during the American Civil War but 
first used with totally devastating effect in the Boer War, dynamite, invented by Alfred 
Nobel, and its derivatives including hand grenades and other forms of personal bombs, and 
chemical weapons, which anarchist groups as well as states were fervently working on.  
 
Although the policies of the U.S. and European states to combat anarchism were often 
based on the assumption of fighting a well-organized international terrorist network, in fact 
there was little international or centralized terrorist planning (and in the case of the 
McKinley assassination, no organized plot at all). Rather, as with current Jihadist operations, 
anarchist attacks were usually carried out by peer groups (mostly friends and sometimes 
kin) who organized themselves in operational cells of a few people. As with modern 
Jihadism, anarchist ideology and operations often parasitized pre-existing local ethnic and 
national aspirations and organizations: for example, the Serbian “Black Hand,” which 
plotted the assassination of Austria’s Archduke Ferdinand, sparking WWI. Following WWI, 
Bolshevism effectively co-opted militant anarchism as a world political force – a process that 
culminated with Stalin undermining the anarchists the anarchist role on the Republican side 
during the Spanish Civil War. Then, with Communism’s demise, came Jihadism’s rise. 
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